David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub. 341--63 (2008)
Let’s begin with a simple example. Consider two quarks: one near the tip of your nose, the other near the center of Alpha Centauri. Here is a question about these two subatomic particles: Is there an object that has these two quarks as its parts and that has no other parts? According to one view of the matter (a view that is surprisingly endorsed by a great many contemporary philosophers), the answer to this question is Yes. But I think it is fair to say that according to common sense, the answer to this question is really No, there is no object that has as its only two parts a quark near the tip of your nose and another quark near the center of Alpha Centauri.
|Keywords||mereology universalism restricted composition material objects nihilism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). From Nihilism to Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):175 – 191.
Robert Carry Osborne (2016). Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):197-221.
Ned Markosian (2015). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):665-687.
Christopher Weaver (2012). What Could Be Caused Must Actually Be Caused. Synthese 184 (3):299-317.
Jeroen Smid (2015). The Ontological Parsimony of Mereology. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3253-3271.
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