Online research in philosophy

Two experiments were conducted to show that the IF … THEN … rules used in the different versions of Wason's (1966) selection task are not psychologically—though they are logically—equivalent. Some of these rules are considered by the participants as strict logical conditionals, whereas others are interpreted as expressing a biconditional relationship. A deductive task was used jointly with the selection task to show that the original abstract rule is quite ambiguous in this respect, contrary to deontic rules: the typical “error” made by most people may indeed be explained by the fact that they consider the abstract rule as a biconditional. Thus, there is no proper error or bias in the selection task as it is still argued, but a differential interpretation of the rule. The need for taking into account a pragmatic component in the process of reasoning is illustrated by the experiments.

In problem solving research insights into the relationship between monitoring and control in the transfer of complex skills remain impoverished. To address this, in four experiments participants solved two complex control tasks that were identical in structure but varied in presentation format. Participants learnt either to solve the second task, based on their original learning phase from the first task, or learnt to solve the second task, based on another participant’s learning phase. Experiment 1 showed that, under conditions in which participants’ learning phase was experienced twice, performance deteriorated in the second task. In contrast, when the learning phases in the first and second tasks differed, performance improved in the second task. Experiment 2 introduced instructional manipulations that induced the same response patterns as Experiment 1. In Experiment 3 further manipulations were introduced that biased the way participants evaluated the learning phase in the second task. In Experiment 4, judgments of self-efficacy were shown to track control performance. The implications of these findings for theories of complex skill acquisition are discussed.

The focus of this paper is to examine the problem of induction as a methodology for science. It also evaluates Karl Popper’s deductive approach as the suitable methodology for scientific research. Popper calls his theory ‘hypothetico-deductive methodology’. However, this paper argues the thesis that Popper’s theory of hypothetico-deductive methodology, which he claims is the only appropriate methodology of science is fraught with some theoretical difficulties, which makes it unacceptable. Popper’s logical asymmetry between verification and falsification, we argue, is philosophically untenable. We argue the thesis for the complementarity of both inductive and deductive methodology in scientific investigation. This study seeks to establish the resonance of accepting both deductive and inductive reasoning as the basic methodologies upon which scientific research and discoveries proceed.

The focus of this paper is to examine the problem of induction as a methodology for science. It also evaluates Karl Popper’s deductive approach as the suitable methodology for scientific research. Popper calls his theory ‘hypothetico-deductive methodology’. However, this paper argues the thesis that Popper’s theory of hypothetico-deductive methodology, which he claims is the only appropriate methodology of science is fraught with some theoretical difficulties, which makes it unacceptable. Popper’s logical asymmetry between verification and falsification, we argue, is philosophically untenable. We argue the thesis for the complementarity of both inductive and deductive methodology in scientific investigation. This study seeks to establish the resonance of accepting both deductive and inductive reasoning as the basic methodologies upon which scientific research and discoveries proceed.

An application of the Method of Analysis of Relational Complexity (MARC) to suppositional reasoning in the knight-knave task is outlined. The task requires testing suppositions derived from statements made by individuals who either always tell the truth or always lie. Relational complexity (RC) is defined as the number of unique entities that need to be processed in parallel to arrive at a solution. A selection of five ternary and five quaternary items were presented to 53 psychology students using a pencil and paper format. A computer-administered version was presented to 50 students. As predicted, quaternary problems were associated with higher error rates and longer response times than ternary problems. The computer-administered form was more difficult than the pencil and paper version of the test. These differences are discussed in terms of RC theory and alternative processing accounts. Together, they indicate that the relational complexity metric is a useful and parsimonious way to quantify complexity of reasoning tasks.

Individual differences in performance on a variety of selection tasks were examined in three studies employing over 800 participants. Nondeontic tasks were solved disproportionately by individuals of higher cognitive ability. In contrast, responses on two deontic tasks that have shown robust performance facilitationthe Drinking-age Problem and the Sears Problem-were unrelated to cognitive ability. Performance on deontic and nondeontic tasks was consistently associated. Individuals in the correct/correct cell of the bivariate performance matrix were over-represented. That is, individuals giving the modal response on a nondeontic task (P and Q) were significantly less likely to give the modal response on a deontic task (P and not-Q) than were individuals who made the non-modal P and not-Q selection on nondeontic problems. The implications of the results are discussed within the heuristic-analytic framework of Evans (1996; Evans & Over, 1996) and the optimal data selection model of Oaksford and Chater (1994).

Two types of truth table task are used to examine people's mental representation of conditionals. In two within-participants experiments, participants either receive the same task-type twice (Experiment 1) or are presented successively with both a possibilities task and a truth task (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 examines how people interpret the three-option possibilities task and whether they have a clear understanding of it. The present study aims to examine, for both task-types, how participants' cognitive ability relates to the classification of the truth table cases as irrelevant, and their consistency in doing so. Looking at the answer patterns, participants' cognitive ability influences their classification of the truth table cases: A positive correlation exists between cognitive ability and the number of false-antecedent cases classified as ?irrelevant?, both in the possibilities task and the truth task. This favours a suppositional representation of conditionals.

Groups do better at reasoning tasks than individuals, and, in some cases, do even better than any of their individual members. Here is an illustration. In the standard version of Wason selection task (Wason, 1966), the most commonly studied problem in the psychology of reasoning, only about 10% of participants give the correct solution, even though it can be arrived at by elementary deductive reasoning.1 Such poor performance begs for an explanation, and a great many have been offered. What makes the selection task relevant here is that the difference between individual and group performance is striking. Moshman & Geil for instance (1998, see also Maciejovsky & Budescu, 2007) had participants try and resolve the task either individually or in groups of five or six participants. While, unsurprisingly, only 9% of the participants working on their own found the correct solution, an astonishing 70% of the groups did. Moreover, when groups were formed with participants who had first tried to solve the task individually, 80% of the groups succeeded, including 30% of the groups in which none of the members had succeeded on his or her own. How are such differences between individual and group performance to be explained?

Girotto and Legrenzi's 1993 facilitation effect for their SARS version of Wason s THOG problem a disjunctive reasoning task was examined. The effect was not replicated when the standard THOG problem instructions were used in Experiments 1 and 2. However, in Experiment 3 when Girotto and Legrenzi's precise instructions were used, facilitation was observed. Experiment 4 further investigated the role of the type of instructions in the observed facilitation. The results suggest that such facilitation may result from attentional factors rather than the use of a combinatorial analysis in the problem.

This study was concerned with Wason's THOG task, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning problem for which performance is typically very poor ( < 20% correct). Recently, however, Needham and Amado (1995) and Koenig and Griggs (2004) have observed both facilitation and spontaneous analogical transfer effects for the Pythagoras version of this task. Based on their findings, Koenig and Griggs concluded that in addition to the separation of the data (the properties of the designated THOG) from the hypotheses that need to be generated (the possible combinations of properties written down), an explicit request to generate these hypotheses is necessary to obtain significant analogical transfer. In the present study we extended the generalisability of this conclusion in three experiments with 214 undergraduate participants using O'Brien et al.'s (1990) Blackboard version of the task. We discuss the relationship of the results to dual process theories of reasoning and propose that analogical transfer may be a better criterion than task facilitation for judging participants' task understanding.