Reasons for Moral Conduct

Scanlon grounds all moral principles in claims about "what individuals have reasons to agree to." Analyzing Scanlon's groundwork, I discuss his central reason for being concerned with morality and why personal and impersonal reasons for moral conduct cannot co-exist in his contractualism. I demonstrate that personal values and reasons are incommensurable with impersonal values and reasons. Thus, Scanlon needs to exclude impersonal reasons from the moral theory he advocates. But I argue that there may be a means of inclusion of both the personal and impersonal values and reasons. I propose Aristotelian virtue ethics as a plausible foundation for subordinating the impersonal values and reasons to the value of human rationality in its full capacity. This subordination may provide the defensible condition that Scanlon's contractualism requires to justify moral principles to each person on the grounds of respect for human rationality
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DOI 10.5840/pcw20101716
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Eric Vogelstein (2011). Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.

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