Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival

Cambridge University Press (1998)
Abstract
This book is a major contribution to the philosophical literature on the nature of the self, personal identity, and survival. Its distinctive methodology is one that is phenomenologically descriptive rather than metaphysical and normative. On the basis of this approach Raymond Martin shows that the distinction between self and other is not nearly as fundamental a feature of our so-called egoistic values as has been traditionally thought. He explains how the belief in a self as a fixed, continuous point of observation enters into our experience of ourselves and the world. He also reveals the explosive implications this thesis has for recent debates over personal identity and what matters in survival. This is the first book of analytic philosophy directly on the phenomenology of identity and survival. It builds bridges between analytic and phenomenological traditions and, thus, to open up a new field of investigation.
Keywords Self (Philosophy  Identity (Psychology  Future life
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Call number BD450.M27717 1998
ISBN(s) 9780521592666   0521592666
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    Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
    Patrick Stokes (2008). Locke, Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):645 – 672.
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