Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (4):1352-1370 (1997)
|Abstract||Scientific inquiry is represented as a process of rational hypothesis revision in the face of data. For the concept of rationality, we rely on the theory of belief dynamics as developed in [5, 9]. Among other things, it is shown that if belief states are left unclosed under deductive logic then scientific theories can be expanded in a uniform, consistent fashion that allows inquiry to proceed by any method of hypothesis revision based on "kernel" contraction. In contrast, if belief states are closed under logic, then no such expansion is possible|
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