Scientific discovery on positive data via belief revision

Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):483-506 (2000)
A model of inductive inquiry is defined within a first-order context. Intuitively, the model pictures inquiry as a game between Nature and a scientist. To begin the game, a nonlogical vocabulary is agreed upon by the two players along with a partition of a class of structures for that vocabulary. Next, Nature secretly chooses one structure ("the real world") from some cell of the partition. She then presents the scientist with a sequence of atomic facts about the chosen structure. With each new datum the scientist announces a guess about the cell to which the chosen structure belongs. To succeed in his inquiry, the scientist's successive conjectures must be correct all but finitely often, that is, the conjectures must converge in the limit to the correct cell. A special kind of scientist selects his hypotheses on the basis of a belief revision operator. We show that reliance on belief revision allows scientists to solve a wide class of problems
Keywords inductive logic  belief revision  scientific inquiry
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DOI 10.1023/A:1026569206678
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Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson (2002). Scientific Discovery From the Perspective of Hypothesis Acceptance. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S331-S341.

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