Soc it to me? Reply to McDaniel on maxcon simples

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):332 – 340 (2004)
Abstract
I raised the following question in a recent paper: What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple? And I proposed and defended this answer (which I called 'MaxCon'): Necessarily, x is a simple iff x is a maximally continuous object. In a more recent paper, Kris McDaniel raises several objections to MaxCon, including, in particular, two objections based on a principle about the supervenience of constitution that he calls 'SoC'. The purpose of the present paper is to address the main objections raised by McDaniel, and to show that none of them poses a serious threat to MaxCon.
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Joshua Spencer (2010). A Tale of Two Simples. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):167 - 181.
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