Soc it to me? Reply to McDaniel on maxcon simples
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):332 – 340 (2004)
| Abstract | I raised the following question in a recent paper: What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple? And I proposed and defended this answer (which I called 'MaxCon'): Necessarily, x is a simple iff x is a maximally continuous object. In a more recent paper, Kris McDaniel raises several objections to MaxCon, including, in particular, two objections based on a principle about the supervenience of constitution that he calls 'SoC'. The purpose of the present paper is to address the main objections raised by McDaniel, and to show that none of them poses a serious threat to MaxCon. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Kris McDaniel (2006). Gunky Objects in a Simple World. Philo 9 (1):39-46.
Kris McDaniel (2006). Gunky Objects in a Simple World. Philo 9 (1):39-46.
Kris McDaniel (2007). Extended Simples. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
Ned Markosian (1999). A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
Mark Steen (2011). More Problems for MaxCon: Contingent Particularity and Stuff-Thing Coincidence. Acta Analytica 26 (2):135-154.
Neal A. Tognazzini (2006). Simples and the Possibility of Discrete Space. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):117 – 128.
Gregory Fowler (2008). A Gunk-Friendly Maxcon. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):611 – 627.
Kris McDaniel (2003). Against Maxcon Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):265 – 275.
Kris McDaniel (2009). Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):325-331.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads25 ( #49,575 of 549,068 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,068 )How can I increase my downloads? |

