Something old, Something new: Extending the classical view of representation

Representation is a central part of models in cognitive science, but recently this idea has come under attack. Researchers advocating perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems have argued against central assumptions of the classical representational approach to mind. We review the core assumptions of the dominant view of representation and the four suggested alternatives. We argue that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, but that the insights from these alternative approaches must be incorporated into models of cognitive processing.
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Rebecca Kukla (1992). Cognitive Models and Representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (2):219-32.

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