David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 13 (2):83-92 (1994)
In section 1 we argue that the adoption of a tenseless notion of truth entails a realistic view of propositions and provability. This view, in turn, opens the way to the intelligibility of theclassical meaning of the logical constants, and consequently is incompatible with the antirealism of orthodox intuitionism. In section 2 we show how what we call the potential intuitionistic meaning of the logical constants can be defined, on the one hand, by means of the notion of atemporal provability and, on the other, by means of the operator K of epistemic logic. Intuitionistic logic, as reconstructed within this perspective, turns out to be a part of epistemic logic, so that it loses its traditional foundational role, antithetic to that of classical logic. In section 3 we uphold the view that certain consequences of the adoption of atemporal notion of truth, despite their apparent oddity, are quite acceptable from an antirealist point of view.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael A. E. Dummett (2000). Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford University Press.
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Michael Dummett (1987). Reply to Dag Prawitz. In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers 281--316.
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Citations of this work BETA
W. Dean & H. Kurokawa (2010). From the Knowability Paradox to the Existence of Proofs. Synthese 176 (2):177 - 225.
Julien Murzi (2010). Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269 - 281.
Julien Murzi (2010). Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269-281.
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