David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):385-400 (2010)
An influential view, defended by Thomas Scanlon and others, holds that desires are almost never reasons. I seek to resist this view and show that someone who desires something does thereby have a reason to satisfy her desire. To show this, I argue, first, that the desires of some others are reasons for us and, second, that our own desires are no less reason-giving than those of others. In concluding, I emphasize that accepting my view does not commit one to a desire-based account of reasons. Desires can be simply one kind of reasons alongside many others
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Michael Bergmann (2005). Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
John Broome (2004). Reasons. In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. 2004--28.
Ruth Chang (2004). Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action? In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. 56--90.
Jonathan Dancy (2002). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
Stephen L. Darwall (2001). ''Because I Want It&Quot;. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):129-153.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Donald C. Hubin (2003). Desires, Whims, and Values. Journal of Ethics 7 (3):315-35.
Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2012). Reasons From The Humean Perspective. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):777-796.
Chris Heathwood (2011). Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Attila Tanyi (2011). Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
John J. Tilley (2004). On Desires and Practical Reasons. Acta Analytica 19 (32):5-18.
David Wall (2009). Are There Passive Desires? Dialectica 63 (2):133-155.
Duncan MacIntosh (2001). Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Yonatan Shemmer (2007). Desires as Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):326–348.
Donald C. Hubin (1991). Irrational Desires. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):23 - 44.
Alan H. Goldman (2005). Reason Internalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):505 - 533.
Attila Tanyi (2011). Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.
Attila Tanyi (2010). Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):67-89.
John J. Tilley (2006). Desires and Practical Reasons. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:123-128.
Kris McDaniel & Ben Bradley (2008). Desires. Mind 117 (466):267 - 302.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads66 ( #22,044 of 1,101,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #116,335 of 1,101,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?