David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):385-400 (2010)
An influential view, defended by Thomas Scanlon and others, holds that desires are almost never reasons. I seek to resist this view and show that someone who desires something does thereby have a reason to satisfy her desire. To show this, I argue, first, that the desires of some others are reasons for us and, second, that our own desires are no less reason-giving than those of others. In concluding, I emphasize that accepting my view does not commit one to a desire-based account of reasons. Desires can be simply one kind of reasons alongside many others
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
Mark Andrew Schroeder (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford University Press.
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