Abstract
The paper presents, first, some general remarks about Husserl’s philosophical Phenomenology
in view of relating it to the scientific study of consciousness, and recalls some of the
basic methodological tenets of a Husserlian phenomenology of consciousness (I). It then
introduces some recent work on so-called “mental imagery” in cognitive psychology and
neuroscience (II). Next, a detailed exposition of a reflective analysis of conscious experiences
that involve “imagery” or “images” is given (III), arguing thereby that reflective
conceptual clarifications of various forms of such experiences could contribute to research
into their finer details. In order to show more distinctly that the conscious experiences
involved in the contemporary cognitive and neuroscientific imagery research are indeed
differently structured, a simple notation for designating the various structural components
of the experiences under study will be used. In concluding (IV), some methodological assets
concerning the present proposal of integrating the method of Husserlian phenomenology
into the present-day, and hopefully even more so into the future study of consciousness are
highlighted!