The inapplicability of evolutionarily stable strategy to the prisoner's dilemma

Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/41.4.461
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Louis Marinoff (1994). Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Highway Robbery and Game Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):445 – 462.

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