The nature of information: a relevant approach

Synthese 175 (1):111 - 132 (2010)
Abstract
In "General Information in Relevant Logic" (Synthese 167, 2009), the semantics for relevant logic is interpreted in terms of objective information. Objective information is potential data that is available in an environment. This paper explores the notion of objective information further. The concept of availability in an environment is developed and used as a foundation for the semantics, in particular, as a basis for the understanding of the information that is expressed by relevant implication. It is also used to understand the nature of misinformation. A form of relevant logic—called "LOI" for "logic of objective information"—is presented and the relationship between the justification of its proof theory and the semantics is discussed. This relationship is rather reciprocal. Intuitive features of the logic are used to interpret and justify aspects of the model theory and intuitive aspects of the model theory are used to interpret and justify features of the logic. Information conditions are presented for the connectives and the way that they fit into the theory of information is discussed
Keywords Philosophical logic  Relevant logic  Information theory  Semantics
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Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

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