David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 79 (1):95 - 105 (1995)
This paper is about the open future response to fatalistic arguments. I first present a typical fatalistic argument and then spell out the open future response as a response to that argument. Then I raise the question of how the open future response can be independently justified. I consider some possible ways in which the response might be defended, and I try to show that none of these is a plausible, non-question-begging defense. Next I formulate what I take to be the only plausible, nonquestion-begging defense of the open future response. This defense involves both (i) the claim that the laws of nature are indeterministic and (ii) a certain version of the correspondence theory of truth. Finally, I argue that there is a very surprising consequence of justifying the open future response by making the defense in question, namely, that the past is sometimes open. Fatalism is the view that whatever will happen in the future is inevitable, due to certain considerations about truth and time. Fatalism, in turn, is normally taken to imply that there is no such thing as genuine, human free will. Suppose that I am an anti-fatalist. Suppose I believe that Joe Montana is free to choose what he will have for lunch tomorrow, and suppose I take this case to be a paradigmatic example of one involving both evitability and human free will. Now suppose that I meet a fatalist, who presents the following argument.1..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291-309.
Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2011). Presentism and Truthmaking. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208.
Sven Rosenkranz (2012). In Defence of Ockhamism. Philosophia 40 (3):617-631.
Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi (2014). The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.
Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.
Similar books and articles
Alexander R. Pruss (2010). Probability and the Open Future View. Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):190-196.
Elizabeth Barnes & Ross P. Cameron (2011). Back to the Open Future1. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):1-26.
Alan Rhoda (2007). The Philosophical Case for Open Theism. Philosophia 35 (3-4):301-311.
Kristie Miller (2008). Backwards Causation, Time, and the Open Future. Metaphysica 9 (2):173-191.
Joseph Diekemper (2005). Logical Determinateness, Fixity, and the Symmetry of Time. Philosophical Papers 34 (1):1-24.
Natasa Rakic (1997). Past, Present, Future, and Special Relativity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):257-280.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads184 ( #21,716 of 1,902,753 )
Recent downloads (6 months)20 ( #28,960 of 1,902,753 )
How can I increase my downloads?