David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 82 (October):566-578 (1973)
Physicalism is construed as an extreme form of reductive materialism, along the lines of thomas nagel's well-known characterization. without intending to undermine materialism, it's argued that the defense of physicalism, adjusted to meet graduated difficulties, typically fails to take account of the fact that purely formal considerations regarding predication do not relieve us of the need to demonstrate the propriety of making certain predications of entities of certain sorts; also, that shifting from predications made of persons and the like to predications of events and states obscures, without resolving, the ontological problem of predicating these properties of these entities. an alternative form of materialism is sketched
|Keywords||Identity Metaphysics Physicalism|
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Joseph Margolis (1988). Minds, Selves, and Persons. Topoi 7 (March):31-45.
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