The transparency of experience

Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425 (2002)
A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
Keywords Epistemology  Experience  Intentionality  Sense Data  Transparency
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00205
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,774
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.

View all 90 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

396 ( #1,849 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

39 ( #28,476 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.