Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425 (2002)
|Abstract||A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories|
|Keywords||Epistemology Experience Intentionality Sense Data Transparency|
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