The transparency of experience

Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425 (2002)
Abstract
A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories
Keywords Epistemology  Experience  Intentionality  Sense Data  Transparency
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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.

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