William Heytesbury and the Conditions for Knowledge

Theoria 76 (4):355-374 (2010)
Abstract
Ivan Boh affirms and Robert Pasnau denies that William Heytesbury holds merely true belief to be sufficient for knowledge in the broad sense. I argue that Boh is correct and Pasnau is mistaken, and that there is a long-running orthodox medieval tradition agreeing with Heytesbury about the conditions for knowledge. I offer a hypothesis about the origins, continuance and demise of that medieval tradition, and some remarks about the tradition's significance
Keywords Grosseteste  Heytesbury  definition of knowledge  conditions for knowledge  medieval epistemic logic
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References found in this work BETA
Laurence BonJour, Epistemological Problems of Perception. Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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