What is a non-truth-functional logic?
Studia Logica 92 (2):215 - 240 (2009)
| Abstract | What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable through: (1) genuinely finite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (2) no finite-valued but only an infinite-valued truthtabular semantics; (3) no truth-tabular semantics at all. Any of those logics, however, can in principle be characterized through non-truth-functional valuation semantics, at least as soon as their associated consequence relations respect the usual tarskian postulates. So, paradoxical as that might seem at first, it turns out that truth-functional logics may be adequately characterized by non-truth-functional semantics . Now, what feature of a given logic would guarantee it to dwell in class (1) or in class (2), irrespective of its circumstantial semantic characterization? | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesD. Hyde (1997). From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts. Mind 106 (424):641-660.
J. Michael Dunn (2000). Partiality and its Dual. Studia Logica 66 (1):5-40.
Ross Thomas Brady (forthcoming). Free Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
Stefano Aguzzoli, Matteo Bianchi & Vincenzo Marra (2009). A Temporal Semantics for Basic Logic. Studia Logica 92 (2):147 - 162.
Josep Maria Font (2009). Taking Degrees of Truth Seriously. Studia Logica 91 (3):383 - 406.
C. Caleiro, W. A. Carnielli, M. E. Coniglio, A. Sernadas & C. Sernadas (2003). Fibring Non-Truth-Functional Logics: Completeness Preservation. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (2):183-211.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-07-11Total downloads56 ( #17,747 of 548,973 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,973 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
