What lies beyond same-sex marriage? Marriage, reproductive freedom and future persons in liberal public justification
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):39-58 (2010)
In this article I consider whether the legalization of sex-same marriage implies a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the 'marriage' business by leveling down to a universal civil union status. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Clare Chambers (2013). VII-The Marriage-Free State. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2pt2):123-143.
Similar books and articles
Andrew Stivers & Andrew Valls (2007). Same-Sex Marriage and the Regulation of Language. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):237-253.
Matthew C. Altman (2010). Kant on Sex and Marriage: The Implications for the Same-Sex Marriage Debate. Kant-Studien 101 (3):309-330.
Lawrence Torcello (2008). Is the State Endorsement of Any Marriage Justifiable? Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and the Marriage Privatization Model. Public Affairs Quarterly 22 (1):43-61.
Andrew F. March (2011). Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):246-272.
Brook J. Sadler (2010). Public or Private Good? The Contested Meaning of Marriage. Social Philosophy Today 26:23-38.
Andrew F. March, Is There a Right to Polygamy and Incest? Should a Liberal State Replace "Marriage" with "Registered Domestic Partnerships"?
Added to index2009-11-19
Total downloads42 ( #104,114 of 1,934,702 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #195,964 of 1,934,702 )
How can I increase my downloads?