Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241 (2009)
|Abstract||The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jessica M. Wilson (2011). Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy. The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1994). Attitudes as Nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
William E. Seager (1993). Fodor's Theory of Content: Problems and Objections. Phiosophy of Science 60 (2):262-77.
Marian David (2002). Content Essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.
R. Philip Buckley (2001). Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
A. C. Genova (2007). Externalism and Token-Identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):223-249.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #38,010 of 722,703 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,703 )
How can I increase my downloads?