Where the regress argument still goes wrong: Reply to Knowles

Analysis 59 (4):321-327 (1999)
The Regress Argument is supposed to show that the language of thought hypothesis results in an infinite regress in its explanation of such things as learning, meaning, and understanding. Earlier (in Laurence & Margolis 1997) we argued that the Regress Argument doesn’t work and that even the language of thought’s supporters have given the Regress Argument far too much credit. In this paper, we respond to a critique of our earlier discussion.
Keywords propositional attitude  Language of thought  Regress argument  Knowles, J
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