David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Tamara Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield (1991)
When they abandoned the analytic-synthetic distinction, analytic philosophers substituted for it uncritical appeals to thought experiments or conceivability arguments. Although the history of philosophy is replete with thought experiments, medieval and early modern philosophers developed sophisticated theories concerning what governs what happens in thought experiments. By contrast, contemporary philosophers subscribe to the thesis of facile conception according to which casual allegations of conceivability or inconceivability are taken as good evidence of possibility or impossibility. Philosophers need to adopt standards of thought experimentation like those found in science and to ground them in a general theory of conceivability.
|Keywords||Analysis, Empiricism, Experiment, Thought|
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Margaret Schabas (2008). Hume's Monetary Thought Experiments. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):161-169.
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