Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458 (2011)
Abstract
Peter Singer has argued for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuition. There is, however, a gap between the putative genealogy of moral intuition that Singer offers and his desired methodological claim. I explore three ways to bridge the gap, and argue that the promising way is to construe the genealogy as a debunking genealogy. I sketch an account of how debunking arguments work, and then show that this causes problems for Singer, since utilitarianism itself is liable to be debunked. Finally, I suggest how we can take lessons for ethics from the empirical work, but that the result is a far more restricted kind of anti-intuitionism than Singer was hoping for
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Stephen Buckle (2005). Peter Singer's Argument for Utilitarianism. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (3):175-194.

    View all 15 references

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    David Kaspar (2012). Intuitionism. Continuum International Pub. Group.
    William J. Prior (1987). Compassion. Philosophy and Theology 2 (2):173-191.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-09-11

    Total downloads

    60 ( #21,223 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.