David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458 (2011)
Peter Singer has argued for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuition. There is, however, a gap between the putative genealogy of moral intuition that Singer offers and his desired methodological claim. I explore three ways to bridge the gap, and argue that the promising way is to construe the genealogy as a debunking genealogy. I sketch an account of how debunking arguments work, and then show that this causes problems for Singer, since utilitarianism itself is liable to be debunked. Finally, I suggest how we can take lessons for ethics from the empirical work, but that the result is a far more restricted kind of anti-intuitionism than Singer was hoping for
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Buckle (2005). Peter Singer's Argument for Utilitarianism. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (3):175-194.
F. B. M. de Waal (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Harvard University Press.
Cordelia Fine (2006). Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt (2002). How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (12):517-523.
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