David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458 (2011)
Peter Singer has argued for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuition. There is, however, a gap between the putative genealogy of moral intuition that Singer offers and his desired methodological claim. I explore three ways to bridge the gap, and argue that the promising way is to construe the genealogy as a debunking genealogy. I sketch an account of how debunking arguments work, and then show that this causes problems for Singer, since utilitarianism itself is liable to be debunked. Finally, I suggest how we can take lessons for ethics from the empirical work, but that the result is a far more restricted kind of anti-intuitionism than Singer was hoping for.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
Marc Hauser (2006). Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. Harper Collins.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (2007). On the Genealogy of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Regina A. Rini (forthcoming). Debunking Debunking: A Regress Challenge for Psychological Threats to Moral Judgment. Philosophical Studies.
Isaac Wiegman (2015). The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):n/a-n/a.
Derek Leben (2012). When Psychology Undermines Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-23.
Similar books and articles
Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology. In Neil Levy & Jens Clausen (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer
Joakim Sandberg & Niklas Juth (2011). Ethics and Intuitions: A Reply to Singer. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 15 (3):209-226.
Rachel Tillman (2013). Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer. Hypatia 28 (1):18-31.
Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell (2012). On the Normative Significance of Experimental Moral Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):311-330.
Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Mark T. Nelson (1991). Intuitionism and Subjectivism. Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):115-121.
Jack Temkin (1984). Singer, Moore, and the Metaphysics of Morals. Philosophy Research Archives 10:567-571.
Thomas W. Smythe & Thomas G. Evans (2007). Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge. Philosophia 35 (2):233-247.
Steve Clarke (2008). Sim and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.
David Kaspar (2012). Intuitionism. Continuum International Pub. Group.
William J. Prior (1987). Compassion. Philosophy and Theology 2 (2):173-191.
David Morrow (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.
Jillian Craigie (2011). Thinking and Feeling: Moral Deliberation in a Dual-Process Framework. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):53-71.
Added to index2010-09-11
Total downloads82 ( #36,191 of 1,725,430 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #134,582 of 1,725,430 )
How can I increase my downloads?