David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philo 11 (2):145-164 (2008)
Not all beings matter from the moral point of view. But how are we to distinguish those that do from those that do not? Some argue that mere sentience alone makes a being matter morally. Others argue that an ability to set ends and thus to place value on those ends is necessary for moral value. I break from these views and argue for a radically more inclusive account of the source of moral value. What makes a being matter morally is that it has a good of its own
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