David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophia 28 (1-4):491-501 (2001)
I suggest that Carter and Hestevold's arguments for L1 and L2 can be given a chance to succeed if (i) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Transient Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism, and (ii) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Static Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism's denial. I'm fairly confident that their arguments for L1 would succeed if these changes were made. (If Presentism is true, nothing has temporal parts, for some at least of the temporal parts of a thing extended in time must be past or future. But if nothing has temporal parts, Endurance must be true.) I'm less confident that their arguments for L2 would succeed if those changes were made. But if the changes that I suggest are not made, the arguments for L1 and L2 certainly fail
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2011). No Suicide for Presentists. Logos and Episteme 2 (3):455-464.
Eric T. Olson (2006). Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood. Noûs 40 (4):738–752.
Kathrin Koslicki (2003). The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
Jeffrey Grupp (2005). The Impossibility of Temporal Relations Between Non-Identical Times: New Arguments for Presentism. Disputatio 1 (18):1-35.
Josh Parsons (2000). Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist 83 (3):399-418.
Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala (2004). Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts? In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oup Oxford.
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time. Dissertation, Lund University
Dean W. Zimmerman (1996). Persistence and Presentism. Philosophical Papers 25 (2):115-126.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #156,754 of 1,139,993 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #92,708 of 1,139,993 )
How can I increase my downloads?