David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):33 - 46 (2005)
I discuss three views of promising: the view is that promising is a social practice, and that our obligation to keep promises is related to the practice in some way; Scanlon’s non-practice view, and Wallace and Kolodny’s “hybrid view”. I shall argue that none of these accounts is satisfactory, and propose a fourth view: deflationism. Deflationism is the view that saying “I promise” merely adds emphasis and does not incur any extra obligation.
|Keywords||Promises Practices R. Jay Wallace Niko Kolodny Assurance Hybrid view Consequentialism Assurance Scanlon Deflationism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Kenneth Shockley (2008). On That Peculiar Practice of Promising. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):385 - 399.
Ashley Dressel (2015). Directed Obligations and the Trouble with Deathbed Promises. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):323-335.
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