Biological universals and the nature of fear

Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):105-132 (1998)
Abstract Cognitive definitions cannot accommodate fear as it occurs in species incapable of sophisticated cognition. Some think that fear must, therefore, be noncognitive. This paper explores another option, arguably more in line with evolutionary theory: that like other "biological universals" fear admits of variation across and within species. A paradigm case of such universals is species: it is argued that they can be defined by ostension in the manner of Putnam and Kripke without implying that they must have an invariable essence. Emotions can be defined in this way too, in principle, but the theoretical understanding of homology necessary to do so is lacking at present.
Keywords Natural Kinds  emotion  homology  species
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,653
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    35 ( #34,083 of 548,984 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #25,729 of 548,984 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums