David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):105-132 (1998)
Cognitive definitions cannot accommodate fear as it occurs in species incapable of sophisticated cognition. Some think that fear must, therefore, be noncognitive. This paper explores another option, arguably more in line with evolutionary theory: that like other "biological universals" fear admits of variation across and within species. A paradigm case of such universals is species: it is argued that they can be defined by ostension in the manner of Putnam and Kripke without implying that they must have an invariable essence. Emotions can be defined in this way too, in principle, but the theoretical understanding of homology necessary to do so is lacking at present.
|Keywords||Natural Kinds emotion homology species|
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Michael Devitt (2008). Resurrecting Biological Essentialism. Philosophy of Science 75 (3):344-382.
Jason A. Clark (2010). Relations of Homology Between Higher Cognitive Emotions and Basic Emotions. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):75-94.
Bence Nanay (2010). Population Thinking as Trope Nominalism. Synthese 177 (1):91 - 109.
Matteo Mameli (2006). Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (1):101-121.
Marc Ereshefsky (2012). Homology Thinking. Biology and Philosophy 27 (3):381-400.
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