Causes, Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):655-672 (2010)
| Abstract | In order to motivate the thesis that there is no single concept of causation that can do justice to all of our core intuitions concerning that concept, Ned Hall has argued that there is a conflict between a counterfactual criterion of causation and the condition of causal locality. In this paper I critically examine Hall's argument within the context of a more general discussion of the role of locality constraints in a causal conception of the world. I present two strategies that defenders of counterfactual accounts of causation can pursue to respond to Hall's challenge?including the adoption of a counterfactual condition that is sufficient for causal action-at-a-distance in place of Hall's ?process? condition?and conclude that Hall's argument against counterfactual accounts of causation is unsuccessful | |||||||||
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