Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279 (2009)
|Abstract||Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005)|
|Keywords||Disagreement Conciliation Evidence|
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