Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Abstract
Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005)
Keywords Disagreement  Conciliation  higher-order doubts or evidence
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    References found in this work BETA
    Richard Feldman (2005). Respecting the Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.

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