Definition and Concept. Aristotelian Definition Vindicated

Studia Neoaristotelica 5 (1):3-37 (2008)
Abstract
The modern (Russellian) theory of definition conceives definitions as abbreviations, so that the question of adequateness (let alone of truth-value) of definitions becomes meaningless. In this paper we show that beside Russellian conception of definitions understood as abbreviations, there is an Aristotelian conception, which exploits the notion of essence and that this conception can be rehabilitated from the standpoint of the modern logic (in particular by means of Pavel Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic). Also Carnap’s ‘explication’ indicates that what we feel to be a definition is frequently distinct from a Russellian definition
Keywords Catholic Tradition  History of Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 1214-8407
DOI 10.5840/studneoar20085111
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Pavel Materna (2013). Simple Concepts. Acta Analytica 28 (3):295-319.
Pavel Materna (2009). Concepts and Recipes. Acta Analytica 24 (1):69-90.

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