Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424 (2004)
In this article I argue that insanity defences such as M’Nagten should be abolished in favour of a defence of failed agency. It is not insanity per se, or any other empirical condition, which constitutes the moral reason for exculpation. Rather, we should first recognize the conditions for being a responsible moral agent. These include some capacity to direct and control one’s behavior, a non-delusional component, and the capacity to recognize that one’s behavior is expressive of what they have reason to be doing. When either of these fail in a case involving alleged criminal behavior the defence of failed agency may be appealed to. There may be many causes, including and besides insanity, that give rise to use of the defence of failed agency.
|Keywords||Agency Insanity Defence Responsibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicole A. Vincent (2009). Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments. Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49.
Nicole A. Vincent (2008). Responsibility, Dysfunction and Capacity. Neuroethics 1 (3):199-204.
Similar books and articles
A. Strand (2013). Group Agency, Responsibility, and Control. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):201-224.
Herbert Fingarette (1972). Insanity and Responsibility. Inquiry 15 (1-4):6 – 29.
Hung-Yul So (2007). Beyond Rational Insanity. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:221-227.
Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2002). Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
Heidi L. Maibom (2008). The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3):167-184.
Kenneth Einar Himma (2009). Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral Agency: What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to Be a Moral Agent? [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):19-29.
Lee S. Weinberg & Richard E. Vatz (1982). The Insanity Plea: Szaszian Ethics and Epistemology. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (3):417-433.
John McMurtry (1991). Rethinking the Military Paradigm. Inquiry 34 (4):415-432.
Richard J. Bonnie (2010). Should a Personality Disorder Qualify as a Mental Disease in Insanity Adjudication? Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 38 (4):760-763.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-06-27
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?