From Dummett's Philosophical Perspective
W. De Gruyter (1997)
| Abstract | Introduction: Dummett's Key Traits Following what has been suggested in the preface, in order to understand Dummett's perspective as fully as possible ... | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $98.01 new (27% off) $133.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page | |||||||||
| Call number | B1626.D854.M38 1997 | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 3110149869 9783110149869 | |||||||||
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Fabrice Pataut (1996). An Anti-Realist Perspective on Language, Thought, Logic and the History of Analytic Philosophy: An Interview with Michael Dummett. Philosophical Investigations 19 (1):1-33.
Michael Dummett (2006). Thought and Reality. Oxford University Press.
Jon Cogburn (2005). The Logic of Logical Revision Formalizing Dummett's Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):15 – 32.
D. E. Bradshaw (1998). Meaning, Cognition, and the Philosophy of Thought. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:51-80.
Michael Dummett (2005). Hume's Atomism About Events: A Response to Ulrich Meyer. Philosophy 80 (1):141-144.
Luca Moretti (2008). Dummett and the Problem of the Vanishing Past. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7:37-47.
Jan Dejnožka (2010). Dummett's Forward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism. Diametros 25:118-131.
Ofra Magidor (2007). Strict Finitism Refuted? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):403-411.
Michael Dummett (1988). Reply to `Dummett's Dig', by Baker and Hacker. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):87-103.
John P. Burgess (1984). Dummett's Case for Intuitionism. History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):177-194.
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