Human rationality and the unique origin constraint

In André Ariew (ed.), Functions. Oxford University Press. pp. 341 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper offers a new definition of "adaptationism". An evolutionary account is adaptationist, it is suggested, if it allows for multiple independent origins for the same function -- i.e., if it violates the "Unique Origin Constraint". While this account captures much of the position Gould and Lewontin intended to stigmatize, it leaves it open that adaptationist accounts may sometimes be appropriate. However, there are many important cases, including that of human rationality, in which it is not.

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Mohan Matthen
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

Reid and epistemic naturalism.Patrick Rysiew - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):437–456.
In the Beginning was Game Semantics?Giorgi Japaridze - 2009 - In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 249--350.

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