David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Utilitas 11 (03):277- (1999)
The distinction between killing and letting die is too simple. A third category must also be recognized. Like killing, preventing a person from being saved is a species of doing harm; like killing, it infringes one of the victim's negative rights. Yet preventing a person from being saved is morally on a par with letting die, which infringes one of the victim's positive rights. It follows that we cannot explain the moral inequivalence of killing and letting die by saying, as so many have, that negative rights are more stringent than positive rights. A more promising strategy is suggested at the end of the article
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Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2015). Are Enabling and Allowing Harm Morally Equivalent? Utilitas 27 (3):365-383.
Christian Barry (2012). Local Priorities, Universal Priorities, and Enabling Harm. Ethics and International Affairs 26 (1):21-26.
By Joseph Shaw (2006). Intentions and Trolleys. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):63–83.
Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.
Samuel C. Rickless (2011). The Moral Status of Enabling Harm. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):66-86.
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