David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 6 (11):828-841 (2011)
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of philosophers, notably Churchland, Field, Stalnaker, Dennett, and Davidson, began to argue that propositional attitude predicates are a species of measure predicate, analogous in important ways to numerical predicates by which we attribute physical magnitudes . Other philosophers, including myself, have subsequently developed the idea in greater detail. In this paper I sketch the general outlines of measurement‐theoretic accounts of propositional attitudes, explaining in the briefest terms the basic idea of such accounts, why some have thought such accounts plausible, how these accounts might go, what their implications might be both for our conception of propositional attitudes and for their role in cognitive scientific theorizing, and where the potential problems with such accounts might lie
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Noam A. Chomsky (1980). Rules and Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Donald Davidson (1968). On Saying That. Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.
Donald Davidson (1989). What is Present to the Mind? In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi. 197-213.
JoséA Díez (1997). A Hundred Years of Numbers. An Historical Introduction to Measurement Theory 1887–1990. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (2):237-265.
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