Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View

Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208 (2010)
Abstract
Among theories of personal identity over time the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a view open to an objection from the failure to provide a condition of individuation. If, on the other hand something like a soul is said to ground personal identity over time, such an account turns out to be more suited to a kind of continuity view.
Keywords Personal Identity  Simple View  Causal condition
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References found in this work BETA
Troy Catterson (2008). Introduction. Synthese 162 (3):309-311.
Bruce Langtry (1975). Similarity, Continuity and Survival. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):3 – 18.

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