Players with fixed resources in Elimination Tournaments

Abstract

We consider T -round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. We show that players always spend a higher share of their resources in early than in later rounds in a symmetric equilibrium. Equal resource allocation across T rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case. Applications for career paths, elections, and sports are discussed

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-19

Downloads
20 (#656,247)

6 months
4 (#319,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references