David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316 (2011)
A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology. Although these accounts have been useful for explaining some psychological states, one feature?phenomenality or consciousness?has proven to be particularly intractable. The Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) has been offered as one reductive theory of consciousness. According to HOT, a mental state is conscious if it becomes the content of a suitable higher-order thought that one is in that mental state. In recent years, critics have lodged a series of challenging objections to the view and several alternative theories have been proposed in response to these objections. This paper offers a defense of the traditional Higher-Order Thought theory. First, two different models of consciousness based on HOT are distinguished. The paper argues that one of the models is better supported by the HOT literature. It is then demonstrated that the better supported model is not vulnerable to the objections most commonly lodged against the HOT theory. Finally, it is shown that alternative self-representational theories do not improve upon the HOT theory in the way that they are proposed to. In fact, each of the alternative self-representational views reviewed here is vulnerable to a unique set of problems. In light of these factors, HOT still offers a viable reductive solution to the hard problem
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Kati Balog (2000). Comments on David Rosenthal's “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Alex Byrne (1997). Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):103-29.
Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001). Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework. Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Precis of Consciousness Explained. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):889-931.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Rocco J. Gennaro (2005). The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.
Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
Rocco J. Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the Actualist HOT Theory of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.
Peter Carruthers (2004). Hop Over FOR, HOT Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
Robert W. Lurz (2003). Advancing the Debate Between HOT and FO Accounts of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:23-44.
Jacob Berger (2014). Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
Joshua Shepherd (2013). Why Block Can't Stand the HOT. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):183-195.
Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
Caleb Liang & Timothy Lane (2009). Higher-Order Thought and Pathological Self: The Case of Somatoparaphrenia. Analysis 69 (4):661-668.
David Miguel Gray (2012). HOT: Keeping Up Appearances? Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):155-163.
Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Are There Pure Conscious Events? In Chandana Chakrabarti & Gordon Haist (eds.), Revisiting Mysticism. Cambridge Scholars Press. 100--120.
David Miguel Gray (2012). Hot. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):155-163.
Vincent Picciuto (2011). Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):109-136.
Added to index2011-03-01
Total downloads42 ( #47,715 of 1,410,543 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #179,143 of 1,410,543 )
How can I increase my downloads?