David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206 (2012)
A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the sensory receptors. According to the active-externalist theory of perception, amodal perception depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper focuses on amodal visual perception and presents a counter-example to the idea that active-externalism can account for amodal perception. The counterexample involves the experience of so-called ‘impossible objects’, objects experienced in perceptual character as having geometrical properties that no physically real object can have
|Keywords||perception enactivism active-externalism extended mind amodal perception representation perceptual phenomenology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the Brain. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):263-284.
Kenneth Aizawa (2007). Understanding the Embodiment of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 104 (1):5-25.
Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.
Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
Mohan Matthen (2014). Active Perception and the Representation of Space. In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. 44-72.
Lawrence W. Barsalou (1999). Perceptions of Perceptual Symbols. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):637-660.
Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Speech Perception. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford.
Susanna Siegel (2006). Which Properties Are Represented in Perception? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 481--503.
Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Object Perception: Vision and Audition. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):803-829.
K. Sathian (2004). Modality, Quo Vadis? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):413-414.
Pete Mandik (2005). Action-Oriented Representation. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. 284--305.
Gary C. Hatfield (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Qasim Zaidi & A. Fuzz Griffiths (2002). Generic Assumptions Shared by Visual Perception and Imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):215-216.
Justin P. McBrayer (2010). A Limited Defense of Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
Added to index2011-09-06
Total downloads92 ( #16,480 of 1,410,465 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #22,719 of 1,410,465 )
How can I increase my downloads?