Representing the impossible

Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206 (2012)
Abstract
A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the sensory receptors. According to the active-externalist theory of perception, amodal perception depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper focuses on amodal visual perception and presents a counter-example to the idea that active-externalism can account for amodal perception. The counterexample involves the experience of so-called ‘impossible objects’, objects experienced in perceptual character as having geometrical properties that no physically real object can have
Keywords perception  enactivism  active-externalism  extended mind  amodal perception  representation  perceptual phenomenology
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References found in this work BETA
Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the Brain. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):263-284.

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