Selection and Causation
Philosophy of Science 76 (2):201-224 (2009)
| Abstract | We have argued elsewhere that: (A) Natural selection is not a cause of evolution. (B) A resolution-of-forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own “hierarchical realization model” of how evolutionary influences combine. | |||||||||
| Keywords | natural selection statistical interpretation of natural selection reification of natural selection | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Philippe Huneman (2012). Natural Selection: A Case for the Counterfactual Approach. Erkenntnis 76 (2):171-194.
Denis M. Walsh, Andre Ariew & Tim Lewens (2002). The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):452-473.
Maximiliano Martínez (2011). Natural Selection and Multi-Level Causation. Philosophy and Theory in Biology 3.
D. M. Walsh (2004). Bookkeeping or Metaphysics? The Units of Selection Debate. Synthese 138 (3):337 - 361.
Pablo Razeto-Barry & Ramiro Frick (2011). Probabilistic Causation and the Explanatory Role of Natural Selection. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (3):344-355.
Mohan Matthen & Andre Ariew (2005). How to Understand Casual Relations in Natural Selection: Reply to Rosenberg and Bouchard. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):355-364.
Mohan Matthen (2010). What is Drift? A Response to Millstein, Skipper, and Dietrich. Philosophy and Theory in Biology 2.
Mohan Matthen & André Ariew (2002). Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection. Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):55-83.
Mohan Matthen & André Ariew (2009). Selection and Causation. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):201-224.
Toru Shimizu (2006). Brain Evolution by Natural Selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):23-24.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-05-30Total downloads158 ( #2,266 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,383 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |
| Start a new thread | There are 2 threads in this forum |
| 2009-09-02 | |
|
Marcello Pucciarelli
Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" |
Received views are an important part of our symbolic order. Once it becomes apparent that they cannot possibly be true, it is sometimes a valuable philosophical task to preserve them, since no rational and educated person could actually believe them. As an example of a critically endangered received view, consider Jerry Coyne's excellent book, Why Evolution Is True:
[T]he process of evolution -- natural selection, the mechanism that drove the first naked, replicating molecule into the diversity of millions of fossil and living forms -- is a mechanism of staggering simplicity and beauty.The received view is that natural selection is a mechanism or process that shapes all living things, and that the study of natural selection explains a lot about the history of life on Earth. Natural selection makes it possible to treat the billion years of organic evolution as a coherent narrative, making biology an endless reserve of wonder, understanding, and enjoyment. Matthen and Ariew (2002, e ... (read more)
Latest replies:
|
| 2009-10-21 | |
|
Jonathan Birch
Cambridge University |
Notwithstanding the arguments of Matthen&Ariew, there is still a simple and banal sense in which "natural selection is a cause of evolution". I presume Matthen & Ariew would not dispute that complex adaptations arise as the cumulative effect of the selection of genes. So the selection of genes causes the evolution of complex adaptations.
As far as I can see, this claim is compatible with seeing the "selection" here as a statistical trend (or "outcome") rather than a causal process (or "force"). Of course, if by "evolution", one merely means "change in gene frequencies", it would be questionable to call selection a cause of evolution for all the reasons Matthen & Ariew give. But if one means "evolution of complex adaptations", selection most certainly is a cause, however one conceives of selection.
Latest replies:
|

