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- André Ariew & Mohan Matthen (2009). Selection and Causation. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):201-224.We have argued elsewhere that: (A) Natural selection is not a cause of evolution. (B) A resolutionof-forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own “hierarchical realization model” of how evolutionary influences combine.
Discussion of André Ariew & Mohan Matthen, Selection and Causation
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Jonathan Birch 2009-10-21 |
Jonathan Birch 2009-12-08 |
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The fate of the received view of natural selection
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Marcello Pucciarelli 2009-09-02 |
Arlin Stoltzfus 2009-12-04 |
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We have argued elsewhere that natural selection is not a cause of evolution, and that a resolution‐of‐forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own ‘hierarchical realization model’ of how evolutionary influences combine. *Received June 2008; revised May 2009. †To contact the authors, (...)
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