The epistemic features of group belief

Episteme 2 (3):161-175 (2006)
Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's infl uential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational
Keywords Belief  Commitment  Epistemology  Group  Rationality  Truth  Gilbert, Margaret
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.161
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Don Fallis (2007). Collective Epistemic Goals. Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280.
J. Angelo Corlett (2007). Analyzing Social Knowledge. Social Epistemology 21 (3):231 – 247.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

75 ( #40,920 of 1,725,157 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #134,554 of 1,725,157 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.