The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution

Oxford University Press (2007)
A prospective introduction -- The received view -- Troubles with the received view -- Are propositional attitudes relations? -- Foundations of a measurement-theoretic account of the attitudes -- The basic measurement-theoretic account -- Elaboration and explication of the proposed measurement-theoretic account.
Keywords Propositional attitudes
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Reprint years 2010
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Call number BC181.M38 2007
ISBN(s) 0199585539   9780199211258   0199211256   9780199585533  
DOI 10.1093/analys/ann030
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Peter Hanks (2009). Recent Work on Propositions. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Ephraim Glick (2011). Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.
Mahrad Almotahari (2013). Flaws of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):367-376.

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