Why the no-miracles argument fails

The chief argument for scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the approximate truth of our current scientific theories can be inferred from their success through time. To date, anti-realist responses to the argument have been unconvincing, largely because of their anti-realistic presuppositions. In this paper, it is shown that realists cannot pre-emptively dismiss the problem of the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and that the no-miracles argument fails because it does nothing to dispel the threat posed by underdetermination, although it may be effective against other anti-realistic arguments.
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DOI 10.1080/02698599808573601
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Ilkka Niiniluoto (1989). Truthlikeness. Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (1):297-300.

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