An Argument for the Existence of Tropes

Erkenntnis 74 (1):69-79 (2011)
That there could be ontologically complex concrete particulars is self-evidently true. A reductio may however be formulated which contradicts this truth. In this paper I argue that all of the reasonable ways in which we might refute this reductio will require the existence of at least some tropes.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-010-9252-0
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.

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Anna-Sofia Maurin (2012). Bradley’s Regress. Philosophy Compass 7 (11):794-807.

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