A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity
Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421 (2002)
| Abstract | It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered. | |||||||||
| Keywords | belief ascriptions de re substitutivity | |||||||||
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