A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity

Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421 (2002)
It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered.
Keywords belief ascriptions  de re  substitutivity
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