Bradley's Regress

Philosophy Compass 7 (11):794-807 (2012)
Abstract
Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Donald L. M. Baxter (1988). Many-One Identity. Philosophical Papers 17 (3):193-216.

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