Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2003)
Colour has long been a source of fascination to both scientists and philosophers. In one sense, colours are in the mind of the beholder, in another sense they belong to the external world. Colours appear to lie on the boundary where we have divided the world into 'objective' and 'subjective' events. They represent, more than any other attribute of our visual experience, a place where both physical and mental properties are interwoven in an intimate and enigmatic way. The last few decades have brought fascinating changes in the way that we think about 'colour' and the role 'colour' plays in our perceptual architecture. In Colour Perception: Mind and the physical world, leading scholars from cognitive psychology, philosophy, neurophysiology, and computational vision provide an overview of the contemporary developments in our understanding of colours and of the relationship between the 'mental' and the 'physical'. With each chapter followed by critical commentaries, the volume presents a lively and accessible picture of the intellectual traditions which have shaped research into colour perception. Written in a non-technical style and accessible to an interdisciplinary audience, the book will provide an invaluable resource for researchers in colour perception and the cognitive sciences.
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Brainard & Kraft & Longere, Colour Constancy: Developing Empirical Tests of Computational Models.
Donald Ia Macleod & Tassilo von der Twer, The Pleistochrome: Optimal Opponent Codes for Natural Colours.
R. Mausfeld, 'Colour'as Part of the Format of Different Perceptual Primitives: The Dual Coding of Colour.
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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Gert (2006). A Realistic Colour Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.
Jonathan Cohen (2008). Colour Constancy as Counterfactual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
Joshua Gert (2010). Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual. Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
Wayne Wright (2010). Perception, Color, and Realism. Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
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