Generalist Transworld Identitism (or, Identity through Possible Worlds without Nonqualitative Thisnesses)

Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):151-158 (2005)
A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there are true modal statements de re) are committed to counterpartism (the view that sameness through worlds is not numerical identity). The purpose of this paper is to resist the argument in question by constructing generalist transworld identitism, that is, by providing an account involving identities through possible worlds, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses.
Keywords transworld identity  individuation  thisness (haecceity)
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