Divine eternity

I argue that Open Theism leads to a retreat from ascribing to God ‘complete omniscience’. Having surrendered this ground, the Open Theist cannot but retreat from ascribing to God complete omnipotence; the Open Theist must admit that God might perform actions which He reasonably expected would meet certain descriptions but which nevertheless do not do so. This then makes whatever goodness (in the sense of beneficence, not just benevolence) God has a matter of luck. Open Theism is committed to a partially ignorant God, one who is subject to the vagaries of luck for the efficacy of at least some of His actions and for His goodness.
Keywords Open Theism  Omniscience  Omnipotence  Necessary goodness  Moral luck
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    References found in this work BETA
    William Hasker (1989). God, Time and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    William Hasker (1995). Middle Knowledge. Faith and Philosophy 12 (2):223-236.
    Brian Leftow (2005). No Best World: Moral Luck. Religious Studies 41 (2):165-181.

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