Are There Objective Values?

The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317 (1999)
In this paper I demolish three influential arguments - moral, metaphysical and epistemological - against value realism. We have good reasons to believe, and no good reasons not to believe, that value-features, value-facts, really do exist in the world.
Keywords Value realism  Metaphysical objections  Moral objections  Epistemological objections
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